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Witherspoon in Florida: Reflections on the
Challenge for Cause of Jurors in Capital
Cases in a State in Which the Judge Makes
the Sentencing Decision*
BRUCE J. WINICK**
As national attention focuses on the extensive imposition of
the death penalty in Florida, the author questions the legiti-
macy of the composition of capital juries in the state. Florida
courts permit the removal for cause of jurors who are so op-
posed to the death penalty that they could not vote to recom-
mend it even though they could be fair and impartial in assess-
ing guilt. The author criticizes this practice as inconsistent
with the essential role of the advisory jury in the Florida capi-
tal sentencing scheme, unconstitutional, and without statutory
basis. Suggesting that the removal of these jurors results in
capital juries that may not be impartial in assessing guilt and
do not represent a fair cross-section of the community, the au-
thor calls for a reexamination of the practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida, as in all states, a substantial proportion of poten-
tial jurors in capital cases who have reservations about the death
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penalty are subject to challenge for cause.1 If the potential juror
"has beliefs which preclude him from finding a defendant guilty of
an offense punishable by death," he may be removed for cause as a
matter of statute.2 The removal of these jurors, who might be
called "automatic acquittal" jurors,s is unquestionably correct. The
state as well as the accused enjoys a right to an impartial jury,
and given the requirement of jury unanimity, 5 permitting persons
who could never vote for guilt in a capital case to remain on the
1. In selecting juries, attorneys may exercise two types of challenges to individual ju-
rors-challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. The challenge for cause, based on
statutory grounds, is designed to permit the exclusion of potential jurors who display actual
bias-an acknowledged prejudicial state of mind-or implied bias, presumed from the ju-
ror's relationships or interests in ways specified by statute. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 68-69 (Approved
Draft, 1968); see, e.g., Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887); Fla. Stat. § 913.03 (1983). See
generally J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REP-
RESENTATIVE JURIES 140-69 (1977). Prospective jurors are examined under oath both by the
court and by the attorneys at a proceeding known as the voir dire. See FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.300. The court without motion may excuse any prospective jurors found to be unqualified
to serve. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.300(c). In addition, each party may orally challenge potential
jurors for cause, after which the court will determine the validity of the challenge. See FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.300(c), -.310, -.315, -.320, -.330, -.340.
In addition to challenges for cause, each party may exercise a limited number of pe-
remptory challenges. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 913.08 (1983); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350.
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised with-
out a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's
control. . . .While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory per-
mits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or
demonstrable.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965); see also Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Chal-
lenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1, 6-13 (1982).
Studies and public opinion polls have suggested that between one-half and two-thirds
of jurors opposed to capital punishment are subject to removal for cause in capital cases.
Winick, supra, at 76 n.302 (discussing studies by Ellsworth & Fitzgerald (64% excludable),
Zeisel (53% excludable), and the 1971 Harris Poll (64% excludable)); id. at 30 (table 1)
(62.58% of 147 venirepersons opposed to death penalty in five-year study in a Florida dis-
trict removed for cause). A substantial portion of scrupled jurors remaining after challenge
for cause are also removed by prosecutorial peremptory challenge. See Winick, supra, at 31
(table 2) (76.92% in Florida study).
2. FLA. STAT. § 913.13 (1983); e.g., King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981); Magill v. State, 386 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
927 (1981); see also FLA. STAT. § 913.03(3) (1983) (authorizing challenge for cause of a juror
who "has conscientious beliefs that would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty").
3. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 616 P.2d 1301, 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr.
128, 138 (1980) (typology of the spectrum of attitudes on capital punishment).
4. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887).
5. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.440.
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jury would prevent the possibility of obtaining a conviction. Thus,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the removal of
these jurors, whatever its impact on jury representativeness, is per-
missible in capital cases. 6
In addition to these "automatic acquittal" jurors, it is useful
to identify a second group of potential jurors with reservations
about capital punishment-those whose beliefs do not prevent
them from fairly considering a verdict of guilt, but who could never
recommend a sentence of death. Jurors in this second group, who
might be called "automatic life imprisonment" jurors, are also
subject to removal for cause in Florida,' although the statutory ba-
sis for their removal is less clear. The removal of these "automatic
life imprisonment" jurors is considerably more controversial. The
former statutory schemes for capital punishment, mandating the
death penalty upon conviction of certain offenses, have now been
replaced by statutes making imposition of the extreme penalty dis-
cretionary.9 Under the unitary automatic death penalty schemes
there may have been no reason to distinguish between "automatic
acquittal" and "automatic life imprisonment" jurors, because "au-
tomatic life imprisonment" jurors had no way to assert their oppo-
sition to capital punishment other than to acquit, leading them to
6. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
7. See Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 20, 616 P.2d at 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 138. A third category
of death-scrupled jurors can be identified-the "oppose death penalty" jurors--those who
have reservations about capital punishment but who can fairly consider guilt and will not
automatically vote against death in every case. Id.
8. E.g., King v. State, 436 So. 2d 50, 53 (Fla. 1983); Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 521
(Fla. 1982); Smith v. State, 407 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1981); Maggard v. State, 399 So. 2d 973,
975-76 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981); Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla.
1980); Downs v. State, 386 So. 2d 788, 790-91 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980); Jack-
son v. State, 366 So. 2d 752, 754-55 (Fla. 1978); Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 1978);
Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1977); Nettles v. State, 409 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982); Herman v. State, 396 So. 2d 222, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
In a recent case, a Florida circuit court judge, departing from precedent, denied the
prosecutor's attempt to remove an "automatic life imprisonment" juror for cause. State v.
Hooper, Case No. 82-155-CF (Cir. Ct., Nassau County, June 20, 1983), petition for writ of
mandamus or in the alternative for a writ of prohibition denied, Case No. 63,850 (Fla. Sup.
Ct., June 22, 1983). In denying mandamus or prohibition, the Supreme Court of Florida, in
a brief order, specifically indicated that "[t]he Court has not addressed the issue presented
on the merits." Id.
9. See Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punish-
ment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEx. L. RE V. 545, 549-50 (1961).
Indeed, discretionary death penalty laws are now constitutionally required, the Supreme
Court having invalidated under the eighth amendment statutes providing for mandatory
death sentences upon conviction of certain crimes. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633
(1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
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behave, in the main part, as "automatic acquittal" jurors. Under
these statutes, the state's interest in enforcing the criminal law
thus justified broad exclusion of death-scrupled jurors.'0 But Flor-
ida and other jurisdictions now have bifurcated procedures in capi-
tal cases, separating the trial of guilt from the determination of life
or death, and making the penalty decision discretionary." In view
of this development, the inclusion of "automatic life imprison-
ment" jurors at the first stage of the bifurcated trial will not frus-
trate the state's interest in a fair determination of guilt,'2 nor will
their inclusion at the guilt determination stage frustrate the state's
interest in enforcing its capital punishment scheme if these jurors
do not sit at the separate proceeding on the issue of penalty."3 The
same jury, however, is typically used in both portions of the bifur-
cated capital trial; thus, efficiency considerations are generally
thought to justify removing the "automatic life imprisonment" ju-
rors at the unitary voir dire that is held to select the jury that will
perform both functions."'
In more than three-fourths of the states that authorize capital
punishment, the jury makes the sentencing decision. 15 In Florida,
10. See Oberer, supra note 9, at 550.
11. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1983). Every state authorizing the death penalty, with the
partial exception of Ohio, now provides for such a bifurcated proceeding. Marshall v.
Lonberger, 103 S. Ct. 843, 862 n.8 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing bifurcated statutes
in 33 states); White, Death-Qualified Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Re-
examined, 41 U. Pirr. L. REv. 353, 353 n.2 (1980). Ohio has what may be characterized as a
"half-bifurcated" proceeding-"guilt and aggravating circumstances are considered together
in one phase, mitigating circumstances in a second." Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S. Ct. at
862 n.8; see Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (1982). It has been suggested that bifurcation
may now be constitutionally required, White, supra, at 353 n.2; see Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325, 356 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194-95
(1976) (plurality opinion), although the Supreme Court rejected this contention in 1971.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 220-22 (1971); see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S.
Ct. at 853 (upholding by five-to-four vote the Ohio "half-bifurcated" procedure).
12. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 7-8 n.26 (1980); Oberer, supra
note 9, at 550-51; White, supra note 11, at 355.
13. See White supra note 11, at 397-99.
14. But see Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), appeal pending, No.
83-2113-EA (8th Cir.) (cost and efficiency considerations held insufficient to justify prejudi-
cial impact on guilt determination and jury representativeness resulting from removal of
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors from guilt phase); White, supra note 11, at 399-401
(cost and efficiency considerations too insubstantial to outweigh defendant's interest in in-
cluding "automatic life imprisonment" jurors at guilt determination stage); Winick, supra
note 1, at 57-59 (same).
15. Gillers, supra note 12, at 14, 101-19 app. 1 (1980). In 27 of the 35 states authorizing
the death penalty at the time of Gillers' survey, the jury made the penalty determination,
although in two of these the judge had discretion to reduce a death sentence to life impris-
onment. Id. Thirty-eight states now authorize capital punishment. Anderson, An Eye for an
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however, and in seven other states, the judge decides penalty."6
The United States Supreme Court, although invalidating challenge
for cause procedures in capital cases which broadly remove
venirepersons based on opposition to the death penalty, has specif-
ically declined to disapprove of the removal of "automatic life im-
prisonment" jurors. 17 Given the general practice of having one jury
serve in both portions of the bifurcated capital proceed-
ing-deciding both guilt and sentence-the state's interest in en-
forcing its capital punishment scheme without incurring the cost
and delay of impaneling a second jury presumably justifies the re-
moval of these "automatic life imprisonment" jurors at the voir
dire. This justification, however, remains largely unexamined in
states, such as Florida, in which the judge makes the sentencing
decision. In such instances, the state's interest in imposing a death
sentence in an appropriate case can fully be accomplished even if
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors remain on the capital jury.
Florida courts have assumed without examination the propri-
ety of the removal of these "automatic life imprisonment" jurors.' 8
This assumption is questionable-both as a matter of state law
and of federal constitutional law. Unlike the "automatic acquittal"
jurors, whose removal for cause is specifically authorized by stat-
ute,"9 no specific statutory provision authorizes the removal for
cause of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors in Florida. Thus,
there is a substantial question as to whether the removal of these
jurors is permissible under state law. In addition, there is serious
concern about whether capital juries from which a substantial pro-
portion of jurors with reservations about the death penalty are ex-
cluded can make an impartial determination of guilt. This concern,
supported by an impressive body of social science research, 20 raises
an important due process question as to whether the practice of
removing "automatic life imprisonment" jurors, at least in states in
which the judge makes the sentencing decision, can be justified.
Moreover, the exclusion of these jurors may remove from capital
Eye, TME, Jan. 24, 1983, at 28.
16. In Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska and Oregon, the judge serves as sole deci-
sion-maker; in Alabama, Florida and Indiana, however, the jury makes a non-binding rec-
ommendation on sentence to the judge. See Gillers, supra note 12, at 14; ALA. CODE §§ 13A-
5-46, -47 (1982) (amendment postdating Gillers' survey).
17. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21 (1968). See infra notes 27-49 and
accompanying text.
18. See supra note 8.
19. FLA. STAT. § 913.13 (1983). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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juries a significant portion of those in the community who have
reservations about the death penalty. This raises the additional
question of whether the practice undermines the representative
character of capital juries so as to violate the sixth and eighth
amendments. This article will examine these questions, none of
which, curiously, have been analyzed in the Florida cases.
Not only do these issues have intrinsic interest, but they raise
substantial questions about the validity of death penalty proce-
dures in a state that presently has approximately 217 defendants
awaiting execution, more than any other state in the country.2 1
Capital jury selection practices, and the composition of capital ju-
ries they produce, have taken on added importance in recent years.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have upheld
against eighth amendment attack the substantive validity of capi-
tal punishment for murder 22-at least for the present 2 -but have
21. It is difficult to know precisely how many individuals await execution at any partic-
ular time. Not only does the number change frequently-with defendants being added to
the list, sometimes on a daily basis, as new death sentences are imposed, and others deleted
as appellate and habeas courts reverse death sentences-but official lists frequently con-
tinue to include prisoners still housed on death row whose sentences have been reversed. A
current Florida total around 217 seems reasonable, however. The Miami Herald, April 15,
1984, at 1G, 11G, col. 5. (217 Florida defendants await execution). A generally reliable
source of information on the current death row census is Death Row, U.S.A., a periodic list
by state of death row inmates, published by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc. and frequently cited by courts, the media and scholars [hereinafter cited as
Death Row U.S.A."]. See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908,
909 n.7 (1982). As of March 1, 1984, Death Row U.S.A. reported that Florida had 203 resi-
dents of death row out of a national total of 1311. Death Row U.S.A., March 1, 1984, at 1, 7.
Moreover, the death penalty has become a reality in Florida: four of the eighteen defendants
executed in America since the Supreme Court upheld capital punishment statutes in 1976
were executed in Florida-John Spenkelink on May 25, 1979, Robert Sullivan on November
30, 1983, Anthony Antone on January 26, 1984, and Arthur Goode on April 5, 1984. The
Miami Herald, April 15, 1984, at 1G, 11G, col. 5. No other state has executed more than
three defendants.
The present national total is the largest ever, and is increasing rapidly. See Anderson,
supra note 15, at 28. In the eight states in which the judge rather than the jury decides
penalty, see supra note 16, a total of 387 defendants await execution. See Death Row
U.S.A., supra, at 4, 5, 7, 10, 12; The Miami Herald, supra at 11G. Thus, the constitutional
issues discussed in this article potentially affect 30% of the defendants currently on death
row in America. Of course, to have standing to raise these issues, a defendant would have to
demonstrate that at least one "automatic life imprisonment" juror was removed for cause in
his case. See infra note 165.
22. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187. The Court has rejected the constitutionality of
capital punishment for rape, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion) (death penalty grossly disproportionate to crime of rape of adult women); see Buford v.
State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1039 (1982) (death penalty cruel
and unusual for crime of rape of child under 12), and for felony murder where the defendant
did not commit the murder himself, attempt to do so, nor intend to take life. Enmund v.
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left the penalty's future constitutionality dependent upon contin-
ued acceptance within "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.""4 The composition of the
capital jury is thus of critical importance, even in states like Flor-
ida, where the jury makes only a non-binding recommendation to
the sentencing judge. For even in such states, the recommenda-
tions of capital juries are a reflection of community standards con-
cerning the death penalty,"5 standards that must continue to find
the death penalty acceptable if it is to continue to meet constitu-
tional requirements."
II. Witherspoon v. Illinois
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,7 the United States Supreme Court
for the first time imposed constitutional limits on the ability of the
states to remove potential jurors from capital juries on the basis of
their opposition to the death penalty. Under Illinois law, the jury
had wide discretion in choosing between life imprisonment and the
death penalty at a unitary trial in which guilt and punishment
were determined in the same deliberation by unanimous vote.' A
state statute permitted the prosecutor to remove for cause any ju-
ror who stated "that he has conscientious scruples against capital
punishment, or that he is opposed to the same."' 9 Under this stat-
ute, the trial court eliminated forty-seven venirepersons because of
their general opposition to the death penalty, only five of whom
had stated that they could not vote for the death penalty under
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
23. The constitutional question is open for reconsideration under the Supreme Court's
eighth amendment jurisprudence if society should reject capital punishment in the future.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). See generally
Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978).
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (Supreme
Court's traditional standard for applying the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments).
25. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (jury determinations on sentence serve as a "significant
and reliable objective index of contemporary values"). The Court has frequently noted the
importance of jury determinations in assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment.
See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982); id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299-300
(1972)(Brennan, J., concurring).
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; Winick, supra note 1, at 3-4.
27. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
28. Id. at 512, 518 & n.12.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959); see 391 U.S. at 519.
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any circumstances.30
The Supreme Court held that by permitting the removal for
cause of jurors based merely on their general scruples against capi-
tal punishment, Illinois had denied the defendant his due process
right to an impartial jury on the issue of sentence."' When the
state "swept from the jury all who expressed conscientious or reli-
gious scruples against capital punishment and all who opposed it
in principle,' ' 2 it produced a "hanging jury,"33 one "uncommonly
willing to condemn a man to die."' 34 These jury selection practices
"stacked the deck" 5 against the defendant, producing a "tribunal
organized to return a verdict of death."3 6 This violated one of the
"basic requirements of procedural fairness . . . that the decision
whether a man deserves to live or die must be made on scales that
are not deliberately tipped toward death.31 7
Although restricting the use of challenges for cause to remove
capital jurors based merely on general opposition to the death pen-
alty, the Witherspoon Court did not condemn all challenges for
cause based on opposition to capital punishment. The Court spe-
cifically declined to disapprove of the removal of venirepersons
who made it
unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to
any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case
before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the
30. 391 U.S. at 514.
31. Id. at 523. Witherspoon was a fourteenth amendment due process rather than a
sixth amendment case, as the trial in Witherspoon occurred before the sixth amendment
was held applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and the
Court, two weeks after Witherspoon was decided, declined to give Duncan retroactive effect.
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
32. 391 U.S. at 520.
33. Id. at 523.
34. Id. at 521.
35. Id. at 523.
36. Id. at 521.
37. Id. at 521-22 n.20. Although the Court found it "self-evident that, in its role as
arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to
which the petitioner was entitled," id. at 518, the Court left open the question of whether
such a jury could fairly consider the question of a defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 517-
18. The Court was presented with the preliminary and unpublished results of several studies
indicating that such a jury was biased in favor of the prosecution on the issue of guilt. Id. at
517 n.10. Although the Court rejected this evidence as "too tentative and fragmentary," id.
at 517, it recognized that a defendant "in some future case might still attempt to establish
that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt." Id. at 520 n.18. For further analy-
sis of this issue, see infra notes 96-133 and accompanying text.
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defendant's guilt.38
The first category mentioned by the Court is the group referred to
in this article as "automatic life imprisonment" jurors; the second,
as "automatic acquittal" jurors. The Court has consistently ad-
hered to this formulation, applying Witherspoon to invalidate
death sentences imposed by juries from which even one prospec-
tive juror was excluded for cause because of views on capital pun-
ishment on "any broader basis" than these two categories.2
Witherspoon thus places constitutional limits on the exclusion
of jurors in capital cases; it does not itself authorize the removal of
any jurors. There has been much confusion on this point, however,
as state courts frequently misread Witherspoon as a ground for
disqualifying jurors in capital cases.40 As the Court recently made
clear in Adams v. Texas,41 "Witherspoon is not a ground for chal-
lenging any prospective juror. It is rather a limitation on the
State's power to exclude: if prospective jurors are barred from jury
service because of their views about capital punishment on 'any
broader basis'" than these two categories, any ensuing death sen-
tence cannot be carried out.2
The Witherspoon Court expressly reserved decision on the
constitutionality of the removal of "automatic acquittal" and "au-
tomatic life imprisonment" jurors, neither forbidding nor permit-
ting their exclusion.4 3 In more recent cases the Court squarely ap-
38. 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
39. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per
curiam); Mathis v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (reversing death sentences in consoli-
dated cases); see also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (per curiam) (remanding to
determine whether death sentence can constitutionally stand under Witherspoon); Boulden
v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969) (remanding to determine whether death sentence can stand
under Witherspoon).
40. See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 & n.6 (1980) (citing Texas cases erroneously
referring to Witherspoon as a ground for "disqualifying" prospective jurors). Florida courts
have fallen into this error as well. See, e.g., Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 1980)
(Witherspoon "allows the exclusion of" certain jurors); Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 754, 755
(Fla. 1978) (trial judge properly "followed the dictates of Witherspoon"); Witt v. State, 342
So. 2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1977) (citing Witherspoon for the assertion that it is "proper" to ex-
clude certain jurors).
41. Id. at 48.
42. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
43. See 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 ("[N]othing we say today bears upon the power of a
State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which" these two categories
of jurors were excluded). Id.
The issue before us is a narrow one. It does not involve the right of the prosecu-
tion to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who state that their reserva-
tions about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt. Nor does it involve the State's assertion of a
19831
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proved the removal of "automatic acquittal" jurors"" and, in dicta,
seemed to suggest that propriety of the exclusion of "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors as well.45 Although the exclusion of these
two groups of death penalty opponents would undoubtedly tip the
scales toward death, the Court was unwilling to condemn their re-
moval in view of the state's interest in having a jury capable of
returning a verdict of guilt and a sentence of death. Thus, the
Witherspoon principle reflects a careful balance between conflict-
ing interests-the state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws as
well as its capital punishment scheme and the defendant's interest
in an impartial jury on sentence."' These state interests would be
satisfied if the prosecution could exclude for cause "automatic ac-
right to exclude from the jury in a capital case those who say that they could
never vote to impose the death penalty or that they would refuse even to con-
sider its imposition in the case before them.
Id. at 513-14. In a limited sense, the Court did permit the removal of these two groups of
scrupled jurors, indeed of all scrupled jurors. Although vacating his death sentence, the
Court affirmed Witherspoon's conviction, rejecting his contention that a jury from which all
opponents of the death penalty are removed would not be neutral on guilt. Although willing
to assume that such a jury was biased in favor of death, the Court was not prepared to
assume that it was also biased in favor of guilt, and the incomplete and unpublished reports
cited by Witherspoon in support of his contention were found "too tentative and fragmen-
tary" to justify such a conclusion. Id. at 517-18. The Court's affirmance of Witherspoon's
conviction thus stands as upholding the neutrality of death-qualified juries on guilt. But
Witherspoon's limited holding in this regard was further qualified by the Court's recogni-
tion that the conviction-proneness issue turned on an open empirical question, one that
future studies would address, and that the Court might be willing to reconsider the constitu-
tional issue in light of such studies. Id. at 520 n.18. A substantial number of social science
studies have now been performed on the conviction-proneness issue, see infra notes 99-100
and accompanying text, making the issue ripe for reconsideration. See infra notes 96-133
and accompanying text.
44. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
45. In Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980), the Court stated that it would be per-
missible for a state to bar from jury service those whose beliefs about capital punishment
would lead them to ignore the law or violate their oaths. The Court's language seems to
apply not only to "automatic acquittal" jurors, but to "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
as well. The Court referred to the Illinois law in effect at the time of Witherspoon, which
"required the jury to consider the death penalty," and stated that "[a] juror wholly unable
even to consider imposing the death penalty, no matter what the facts of a given case, would
clearly be unable to follow the law of Illinois in assessing punishment." Id. at 44. There is
uncertainty concerning the reach of the Adams dicta because, under the Illinois procedure
referred to, the capital jury in a unitary trial decided both life and death in the same delib-
eration. 391 U.S. at 512. As a result, an "automatic life imprisonment" juror, unable to
assert his opposition to capital punishment in any way other than to vote for acquittal,
would have behaved as an "automatic acquittal" juror. The Adams dicta may therefore not
apply in the context of a bifurcated trial.
46. Winick, supra note 1, at 44; see Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980) (The
Witherspoon Court's statement, quoted in text at note 38, supra, "seems clearly designed to
accommodate the State's legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who could follow their in-
structions and obey their oaths.").
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quittal" and "automatic life imprisonment" jurors.47 Accordingly,
Witherspoon does not forbid exclusion of these two groups.4' But
once the state's asserted interest in avoiding nullification of its
criminal law or capital punishment scheme is accomplished, the
state's power to exclude comes to an end. At that point, the defen-
dant's right to an impartial jury prohibits exclusion of scrupled ju-
rors on "any broader basis" than is necessary to satisfy the state
interest in avoiding nullification.49
III. THE STATUTORY BASIS IN FLORIDA FOR CHALLENGES FOR
CAUSE IN CAPITAL CASES
A. Section 913.13
Chapter 913 of the Florida Statutes contains a special provi-
sion, section 913.13, entitled "Jurors in Capital Cases."'0 This sec-
tion provides that "[a] person who has beliefs which preclude him
from finding a defendant guilty of an offense punishable by death
shall not be qualified as a juror in a capital case." 1 By its terms,
this section covers only "automatic acquittal" jurors; it does not
disqualify "automatic life imprisonment" jurors. This is the only
Florida statutory provision dealing expressly with the removal of
jurors in capital cases based on attitudes toward the death penalty.
As a result, the natural implication is that a juror with beliefs that
do not "preclude him from finding a defendant guilty of an offense
punishable by death," that only preclude him from recommending
the death penalty-the "automatic life imprisonment" ju-
ror-should be deemed qualified as a juror in a capital case.2 Yet,
47. Professor White has argued, however, that the state's interests do not require re-
moval of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors on the basis that so long as the state has left
the death penalty decision to jury discretion, "it is not apparent why a juror's conscientious
scruples against capital punishment or even her total unwillingness to vote for it in any case
would incapacitate her from participating in the discretionary judgment." White, supra note
11, at 355. See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 528-29 (Douglas, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 522 n.21; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
49. Winick, supra note 1, at 44.
50. FLA. STAT. § 913.13 (1983).
51. Id.; see also id. § 913.03(3) (1983) (authorizing challenge for cause of a juror who
"has conscientious beliefs that would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty").
52. See Williams v. State, 228 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1969), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972):
The statute does not disqualify a person 'to serve as a juror on the trial of any
capital case' merely because he may have 'conscientious scruples against the in-
fliction of capital punishment for murder.' To be disqualified under the statute
to serve as a juror in the trial of a capital case, the 'opinions' of the person must
be 'such as to preclude him from finding any defendant guilty of an offense pun-
ishable with death.'
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recent Florida cases permit the exclusion of "automatic life impris-
onment" jurors without discussing the statutory basis for such
exclusion.
Perhaps such discussion is omitted because of the mistaken
belief that Witherspoon itself constitutes a ground for disqualify-
ing "automatic life imprisonment" jurors for cause. Indeed, lan-
guage in some of the cases suggests that the Supreme Court of
Florida believes that the "dictates of Witherspoon" command ex-
clusion of these jurors.5' As mentioned earlier, however, "Wither-
spoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror. It is
rather a limitation on the State's power to exclude . . . ." The
basis for disqualifying these jurors must therefore be found in state
law, and because Florida law authorizes challenges for cause only
on the enumerated statutory grounds, there must be a statutory
basis for exclusion.5 6
Another reason that discussion of the statutory basis for exclu-
sion of these jurors may be omitted is because Florida law has tra-
ditionally recognized that "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
may be removed under the predecessor statutory provisions to sec-
tion 913.13, which contained virtually identical language.57 Indeed,
in a series of 1969 cases in which defendants attempted to use
Witherspoon to attack the challenge for cause of "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors under this predecessor provision, the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that the statute authorized challenge
for cause of such jurors.58 These cases, however, are distinguishable
because they involve the prior Florida death penalty statute under
(quoting Boyington v. State, 74 Fla. 258, 76 So. 2d 774 (1917) (construing predecessor to §
913.13)).
53. See supra note 8. Such a statutory basis for exclusion for cause is necessary in view
of the requirement of section 913.03 of the Florida Statutes that challenges for cause may be
made only on the specified statutory grounds.
54. See Gafford v. State, 387 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 1980) (Witherspoon "allows the ex-
clusion of" "automatic life imprisonment" jurors); Jackson v. State, 366 So. 2d 752, 755 (Fla.
1978) ("We find that the trial judge followed the dictates of Witherspoon, supra, and prop-
erly excused the jurors."); Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1977) (citing Witherspoon
for assertion that it is "proper" to exclude "automatic life imprisonment" jurors).
55. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. at 47-48; see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
56. FLA. STAT. § 913.03 (1983).
57. Id. § 932.20 (1969), the precursor of which was initially enacted in 1868. See Wil-
liams v. State, 228 So. 2d 377, 379-80 (Fla. 1969), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). E.g., Piccott
v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1959).
58. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S.
935 (1972); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969); Williams v. State, 228 So. 2d 377
(Fla. 1969), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969); see
also Portee v. State,.253 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971).
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which both guilt and sentence were decided by the jury in a uni-
tary procedure."' Florida's present death penalty statute provides
for a bifurcated trial; a separate proceeding on the issue of penalty
follows the trial on guilt."
Under the pre-1972 unitary death penalty procedure, a juror
unable to impose death could frustrate a possible death sentence
by voting to acquit the defendant. As a result, such a juror's opin-
ions would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty of an
offense punishable with death, and he was deemed to meet the
provisions of the predecessor to section 913.13.61 For example, in
Perkins v. State,62 the court discussed a prospective juror who
stated on voir dire that he was against capital punishment. The
juror was excused for cause after stating that there were no cases
in which he could "give the verdict of the electric chair" and that
he was "just unalterably opposed to the idea."63 The Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the juror's exclusion as consistent with
Witherspoon and the Florida statute "since it eventually became
clear this prospective juror's scruples against capital punishment
were such as to preclude him from returning a verdict of guilty if it
might mean the imposition of the death penalty."".
Now that the current Florida death penalty statute bifurcates
the determination of guilt and penalty, this pre-1972 analysis
seems inappropriate. Under the bifurcated procedure a juror able
to find guilt but unable to impose death would not be precluded by
his beliefs from returning a guilty verdict where the offense is pun-
ishable by death. The pre-1972 cases construing the statutory pro-
59. FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(1), 919.23 (1969).
60. Id. § 921.141 (1983). The bifurcated procedure in capital cases was initially intro-
duced in 1972. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-72 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1971)). See
Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?,
64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973).
61. Under the then existing Florida death penalty statute, the death penalty would be
imposed following conviction of a capital crime unless a majority of the. jury recommended
mercy. FLA. STAT. § 919.23(2) (1957). Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that it
was "not unlikely" that a juror "who is opposed to infliction of capital punishment to the
extent that he will not join in a verdict which results therein . . . would vote 'not guilty'
merely to avoid the death penalty, if six other jurors refused to join in a recommendation to
mercy." Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1959). As a result, the court held that if
the juror says that he is opposed to capital punishment to the extent that "he will join in a
verdict of guilty only if accompanied by a recommendation of mercy, he is not qualified"
under the predecessor to section 913.13. Id.; accord Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 876
(Fla. 1969).
62. 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969).
63. Id. at 392-93.
64. Id. at 393.
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vision governing challenges for cause in a context in which there
was a unitary determination of guilt and penalty are therefore in-
applicable to construing the statutory provision after bifurcation.
It can be argued that if the Florida Legislature that provided for a
bifurcated proceeding in capital cases had desired to exclude po-
tential jurors whose beliefs did not preclude a finding of guilt but
did prevent a recommendation of death, it presumably would have
amended section 913.13 to authorize the removal of these jurors.
The absence of such an amendment at the time the death penalty
statute was overhauled arguably supports an inference that the
legislature did not contemplate the exclusion for cause of "auto-
matic life imprisonment" jurors under the new procedure.
This construction is also fully consistent with the logic and
structure of the new death penalty statute. Under the new statute,
the jury renders merely "an advisory sentence" to the court, by
majority (rather than unanimous) vote. The advisory sentence is
based on whether there are "sufficient" aggravating circumstances
as enumerated in the statute; whether "sufficient" mitigating cir-
cumstances exist to outweigh the aggravating circumstances; and,
based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be
sentenced to life imprisonment or death. 5 However, the court is
free to impose a sentence of death notwithstanding the recommen-
dation of a majority of the jury.6 The Supreme Court of Florida
has made it clear that the judge is not bound by the advisory vote
of the jury,67 and Florida judges have imposed death in a substan-
tial number of cases despite jury recommendations of life. 8 In-
65. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1983).
66. Id. § 921.141(3) (1983); e.g., Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1979)
(sentence of death upheld following jury recommendation of life where "the facts suggesting
a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ" (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975))). Indeed, the' judge may
impose a death sentence even where the jury unanimously recommends life imprisonment.
See Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1053, 1058-59 (Fla. 1982).
67. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). The
United States Supreme Court, in construing and upholding the Florida statute, has recog-
nized that "[t]he sentencing authority in Florida [is] the trial judge .... " Proffiltt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976), and that the jury's verdict "is only advisory; the actual sen-
tence is determined by the trial judge." Id. at 249.
68. See Walsh v. State, 418 So. 2d 1000, 1003-04 (Fla. 1982) (listing 31 such cases re-
viewed by the Supreme Court of Florida); Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose
Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97, 125 (table II) (1979) (in 18 (27%) of the 66 death penalty cases to
reach the Supreme Court of Florida in the period discussed, judges had imposed death de-
spite jury recommendations of life); Foley, Florida After the Furman Decision: Discrimina-
tion in the Imposition of the Death Penalty (unpublished, cited in Gillers, supra note 12, at
68 n.318)(judges imposed death in 22 (13.9%) of 158 cases in sample studied in which juries
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deed, it is more accurate to say that the Florida statute provides a
"trifurcated" rather than a bifurcated procedure."
In view of this "trifurcated" structure, section 913.13, dealing
with challenges for cause of jurors in capital cases, fully protects
the state interest in having juries that are able to convict. And,
since under this structure the penalty jury merely makes a recom-
mendation to the judge which he is not bound to follow, permitting
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors to participate in the second
stage will not frustrate the state's interest in imposing the death
penalty in an appropriate case. Reading section 913.13 literally to
limit its application to "automatic acquittal" jurors is thus consis-
tent not only with the plain meaning of the provision but also with
the logic and structure of the death penalty statute.
B. Section 913.03(10)
The only other conceivable provision that could justify re-
moval for cause of the "automatic life imprisonment" juror is sec-
tion 913.03(10) of the Florida Statutes. This general provision gov-
erning challenges for cause permits removal of a juror who "has a
state of mind regarding the defendant, the case, the person alleged
to have been injured by the offense charged, or the person on
whose complaint the prosecution was instituted that will prevent
him from acting with impartiality . . 70 It could be contended
that an "automatic life imprisonment" juror has a state of mind
regarding the "case" that will prevent him from acting with impar-
tiality by construing "case" to include the sentence-recommenda-
tion stage of a capital trial. As these jurors will base their life or
death recommendation on their preexisting beliefs, rather than ex-
clusively on the legally relevant evidence, they can be deemed not
to meet traditional requirements for impartiality. 71 Indeed, the Su-
had recommended life); Isaly, Life Recommendations Overridden by Judges (unpublished
list) (between adoption of new capital punishment statute in 1972 and April 29, 1983, 78
defendants sentenced to death despite jury recommendations of life). This Florida experi-
ence conforms with the findings of the classic study of jury behavior conducted by Profes-
sors Kalven and Zeisel. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 436 (1966) (judges
would have given death penalty in 33% of cases in sample in which jury voted for life). The
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a Florida case questioning the constitu-
tionality of a trial judge's override of a jury's recommendation against the death penalty.
Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984).
69. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975); see also Barclay v. Florida, 103 S.
Ct. 3418, 3429 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
70. FLA. STAT. § 913.03(10) (1983).
71. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 302 (1977) (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975)) (impartial juror is one who will "render a verdict based on the
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preme Court of Florida has taken essentially this approach, al-
though without referring to section 913.03(10), in a case requiring
the exclusion for cause in capital cases of what might be called
"automatic death penalty" jurors-those who can be fair and im-
partial in assessing guilt but who will automatically vote for the
death penalty if the defendant is convicted. 2
Although the argument for construing section 913.03(10) to
justify removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors in capital
cases is persuasive, none of the Florida cases considering removal
for cause of these jurors rely on this provision; rather, they rely on
the predecessor to section 913.13 (the special provision dealing
with jurors in capital cases) or, more recently, simply on the mis-
taken notion that Witherspoon itself authorizes exclusion. More-
over, a plausible argument can be made that the "automatic life
imprisonment" juror is able to act with impartiality in fulfilling his
essential role at the second stage of the "trifurcated" capital trial,
and therefore should not be removed under section 913.13(10).
The essential role contemplated for the jury at this second
stage is simply to express the conscience of the community on the
critical life or death question. The jury is asked to make a general
recommendation on penalty by majority vote.7 Although under
the statute this recommendation is to be informed by the jury's
determinations as to the enumerated aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, much of the statutory language setting forth these
circumstances is so vague that the jury, instead of making a factual
determination, is actually making subjective value judgments con-
cerning the moral significance of the crime and the blameworthi-
ness of the defendant.7' Moreover, the jury is not asked to make
evidence presented in court"); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (defining an "indif-
ferent" juror as one whose "verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the
trial"). Indeed, in an early case the United States Supreme Court applied these traditional
notions to uphold challenge for cause of prospective jurors with scruples against capital
punishment, stating that such jurors would be prevented "from standing indifferent be-
tween the government and the accused, and from trying the case according to the law and
the evidence .... " Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892).
72. Thomas v. State, 403 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1981).
Juror Roberts should have been excused because of a fundamental viola-
tion-the presence of bias against the defendant in the sentencing aspect of a
capital case. This bias violated the express requirements in the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution and in article I, section 16, of the Florida Con-
stitution, that an accused be tried by "an impartial jury."
Id. at 375.
73. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983); see Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1053, 1057-58 (Fla.
1982).
74. See Brown v.. State, 381 So. 2d 690, 696 (Fla. 1980) (recognizing the "imprecision of
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specific findings concerning these factors. 5 Indeed, the determina-
tion of what constitutes "sufficient" aggravating circumstances,
"sufficient" mitigating circumstances, and which set of "sufficient"
circumstances outweighs the other, is left to the sole discretion of
the jury." Thus, the jury has the total discretion to determine
the criteria set forth in our capital punishment statute"); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §
921.141(5)(h) (1983) (whether "[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel"); id. § 921.141(6)(a) (It is a mitigating circumstance if "[tihe defendant has no signifi-
cant history of prior criminal activity." (emphasis added)); id. § 921.141(6)(b) (whether
"[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance" (emphasis added)). The attempt by the Supreme Court of
Florida to define these factors has not eliminated their vagueness. See, e.g., State v. Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974):
It is our interpretation [of § 921.141(5)(h)] that heinous means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile;
and that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indiffer-
ence to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be
included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital
felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from
the norm of capital felonies-the conscienceless, or pitiless crime which is un-
necessarily torturous to the victim.
Extreme mental or emotional disturbance [§921.141(7)(b)] . . . is easily in-
terpreted as less than insanity but more than the emotions of an average man,
however inflamed.
Id. at 9-10. Confounding the vagueness of these terms is the constitutional requirement that
the jury be free to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 112-17 (1982); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see Songer v. State, 365 So. 2d 696, 700 (Fla. 1978) (construing
statute to permit such consideration). See generally Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the
Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of
Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF L. REV. 317 (1981). Their vagueness is further con-
founded by the possibility that a death sentence may be based on nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court of Florida's determination that "[tlhe
aggravating circumstances specified in the statute are exclusive and no others may be used
for the purpose," Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936, 942 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925
(1982); Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119, 1122-23 (Fla. 1980); Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d
882, 885 (Fla. 1979); Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977), the Florida court has applied a
harmless error approach, declining to vacate death sentences in cases in which the trial
judge improperly considered a nonstatutory aggravating factor where the trial judge found
no mitigating circumstances, see, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639, 646 (Fla. 1982);
White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1981); Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964, 971 (Fla. 1981), or
where a mitigating circumstance had only "minor significance." Brown v. State, 381 So. 2d
690, 696 (Fla. 1980). See Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla. 1977). This harmless
error approach was recently upheld in Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
75. See Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1982) ("In fact, in most cases, the trial
judge and this Court know only that a majority of the jury has recommended life or death."
Id. at 1058. The numerical breakdown is not known.); Florida Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases 83 (1982) (polling of capital jury limited to asking whether advisory rec-
ommendation was agreed to by majority of the jury).
76. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 17 (Fla. 1973) (Eryin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 943 (1974).
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what weight is to be given to each aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstance. "The presence or absence of any such circumstance or
combination thereof does not compel any particular result.
Whether a particular aggravating circumstance or circumstances
will outweigh a particular mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances lies solely within the discretion" of the jury." The essential
role of the Florida capital jury, therefore, is, and perhaps must
be, 8 to determine whether it is the "community's belief that [the
crime is] so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death,' 79 and if so, whether there
are nevertheless "aspects of the defendant's character and record
. . . which may call for a less severe penalty . . ."80 In playing
this role, the jury's main function can be seen as expressing the
"conscience of the community." 81 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Florida has described the sentencing recommendation of the Flor-
ida capital jury as "reflecting . . . the conscience of the commu-
nity" and as "represent[ing] the judgment of the community as to
whether the death sentence is appropriate ....
If this is viewed as the essential role of the capital jury in the
second stage of Florida's "trifurcated" death penalty process, then
the preexisting beliefs held by "automatic life imprisonment" ju-
77. Id.
78. See Gillers, supra note 12, at 56.
79. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("acting as 'the conscience of the
community' juries are entrusted to determine in individual cases that the ultimate punish-
ment is warranted," id. at 388; capital jury's responsibility is "choosing between life and
death in individual cases according to the dictates of community values," id. at 389).
80. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (plurality opinion).
81. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968):
A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make
the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the
oath he takes as a juror. But a jury from which all such men have been excluded
cannot perform the task demanded of it. Guarded by neither rule nor standard,
"free to select or reject as it [sees] fit," a jury that must choose between life
imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do nothing
less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of
life or death.
Although the Witherspoon Court was construing a death penalty statute that provided un-
fettered discretion to the jury, whereas the Florida death penalty statute seeks to guide jury
discretion by specifying aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury's role under the Florida
provision is nonetheless essentially to make the discretionary choice between life imprison-
ment and capital punishment, a role that calls upon it to "express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death."
82. Richardson v. State, 437 So. 2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 1983); McCampbell v. State, 421
So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1982); Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936, 942 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 925 (1982).
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rors (as well as those held by "automatic death penalty" jurors)
should not be deemed disqualifying. In automatically voting
against (or for) a recommendation of death, as by definition these
jurors will do, they are performing their essential role of expressing
the "conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life
or death," 3 a role that the United States Supreme Court has iden-
tified as "one of the most important functions any jury can per-
form in making such a selection . ".. ."4 The capital jury "does
not try to determine what the community would say, but in giving
its conclusion, speaks for the community. 8 5 A capital jury culled
of all death penalty opponents cannot speak for the community; it
expresses a distorted view of community values." "Automatic life
imprisonment" jurors, just as jurors with differing views on capital
punishment, including "automatic death penalty" jurors, speak for
the community in voting for or against the death penalty. For the
jury's recommendation accurately to reflect the values of the com-
munity, all their voices must be heard.
It would thus effectuate the purpose of the statutory scheme
to permit service on capital juries of all jurors, regardless of their
views on the death penalty, so long as they can be fair and impar-
tial in assessing guilt. Acceptance of this argument would mean not
only that "automatic life imprisonment" jurors would be allowed
to serve, but that, contrary to existing law, "automatic death pen-
alty" jurors-those who favor capital punishment to the extent
that they will automatically vote for it, although they can fairly
assess guilt and innocence-would also serve. 7 These "automatic
death penalty" jurors also express the conscience of the commu-
nity, and they too can play this essential role with impartiality.
The symmetry reflected in existing law, based perhaps on the per-
ception that if "automatic life imprisonment" jurors are subject to
removal for cause, "automatic death penalty" jurors should be re-
moved as well,88 would thereby not be disturbed: if both groups are
83. Id.
84. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15 (capital jury plays the important function of
maintaining "a link between contemporary community values and the penal system").
85. Gillers, supra note 12, at 64.
86. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520.
87. If this argument is accepted, Thomas v. State, 403 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1981), requiring
removal for cause of "automatic death penalty" jurors, should be overruled, at least to the
extent that such jurors can be fair and impartial in assessing guilt.
88. It may be that the Thomas court thought that the removal of "automatic death
penalty" jurors was required in view of the practice of removing "automatic life imprison-
ment" jurors because of the inherent unfairness of a system wherein "a venireman who
thought it was his 'duty' to impose capital punishment in the event of a conviction was
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permitted to serve, neither the state nor the accused would be
disadvantaged.
The existing practice systematically eliminates from capital
juries some jurors who can be fair and impartial in assessing guilt
because their views on capital punishment are so strong that they
would automatically vote either for life or for death. This practice
limits the jury's ability to reflect community values, providing
Florida sentencing judges with a misleading picture of whether the
conscience of the community demands the death penalty in partic-
ular cases. Moreover, under the existing system, sentencing judges
are misled in the direction of death rather than life imprisonment.
Although both "automatic life imprisonment" and "automatic
death penalty" jurors are excluded for cause," the empirical evi-
dence suggests that the former group makes up ten percent or
more of the community, while the latter constitute only two per-
cent or less.90 The existing practice thus produces advisory juries
in Florida that express a distorted exaggeration of the community's
willingness to impose the death penalty. Not only does this under-
mine the Florida capital sentencing scheme, but it is inconsistent
with Witherspoon's condemnation of jury selection practices in
capital cases that "stack the deck" against the defendant and that
produce decisionmaking on "scales that are . . . deliberately
tipped toward death."9
Given the limited and basically subjective and discretionary
role of the capital jury in Florida, both "automatic life imprison-
ment" and "automatic death penalty" jurors should be deemed
able to participate with impartiality. Indeed, their preexisting be-
liefs concerning capital punishment in general, rather than being
disqualifying, would seem indispensable to the ability of capital ju-
rors to express community sentiments. Although these strongly
held beliefs might be deemed disqualifying if the jury in Florida
were asked to make specific findings with regard to the existence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the statutory scheme
does not ask the jury to play this role." In fact, the statutory
permitted to serve, while those whose dictates of conscience would presumably feel a con-
verse duty were summarily excluded from service," Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 303
(4th Cir.), vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Witherspoon, 393
U.S. 76 (1968), reinstated (unreported), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970). See Thomas v.
State, 403 So. 2d at 375 (quoting argument of counsel below); id. at 376 (citing Crawford).
89. See supra note 8; Thomas v. State, 403 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1981).
90. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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scheme assigns to the trial judge the task of making specific find-
ings concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances,93 find-
ings that he must make independently and without any benefit of
jury findings in this regard. The jury's role is basically to act as a
conduit for community values on the life or death question, and all
jurors who are able to assess guilt fairly can contribute to this pro-
cess regardless of their views on capital punishment.
Section 913.03(10) of the Florida Statutes, the general chal-
lenge for cause provision dealing with states of mind that will pre-
clude a juror from "acting with impartiality," may thus be con-
strued either to authorize the exclusion of "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors, or not to authorize their exclusion. This ap-
pears to be an open question in Florida law, as the modern cases
upholding the removal for cause of these jurors do not discuss the
statutory basis for their exclusion.9 4 The following section dis-
cusses the constitutional considerations that are relevant to the in-
quiry, considerations that should, under general principles,9" in-
form the construction of this somewhat ambiguous statutory
provision.
93. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983). Although the statute requires such findings to be
made in writing only where the judge imposes a sentence of death, the Supreme Court of
Florida, under its constitutional power to regulate practice and procedure in the courts, has
imposed a parallel requirement of written findings by the trial judge where he rejects the
death penalty and imposes life imprisonment. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
94. See cases cited supra note 8.
95. It is a "cardinal principle" of statutory construction in Florida that "when the con-
stitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpre-
tations, by one of which it would be valid, it is the duty of the Court to adopt that construc-
tion which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity." Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d
536, 546 (Fla. 1953); accord State v. Lick, 390 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1980); Florida State Board
of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So. 2d 653, 656 (Fla. 1979); Leeman v. State, 357 So. 2d
703, 705 (Fla. 1978); State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. 1975); State v. Dinsmore, 308
So. 2d 32, 38 (Fla. 1975). This, of course, is also the approach taken by other courts. See
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947) (Supreme Court
will avoid passing upon the constitutionality of a statute "if a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ("The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and
not to destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a
statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty
is to adopt that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the
same."); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (when con-
stitutionality of a statute is drawn in question, Supreme Court "will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.");
United States v. Boerner, 508 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013
(1975).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Sixth Amendment/Due Process Right to Jury
Impartiality on Guilt
In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court was unwilling to assume
that a jury from which all venirepersons with reservations about
the death penalty were excluded, although biased in favor of death,
was also biased in favor of conviction. The incomplete and unpub-
lished versions of three studies cited on appeal in support of this
contention were considered by the Court to be "too tentative and
fragmentary" to warrant such a conclusion." Nevertheless, the
Court regarded the question as an open one and suggested that
future studies might result in a different ruling.97
An impressive body of social science research has emerged in
response to the Witherspoon invitation in the fifteen years since
the Court's decision. This research calls for reexamination of the
question whether a jury from which substantially all opponents of
the death penalty have been removed is "less than neutral with
respect to guilt.""e Two of the three incomplete and unpublished
studies that were before the Court in Witherspoon have since been
completed and published,9e and various new empirical studies have
been performed.100 Several cases in which defendants have at-
96. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517.
97. Id. at 520 n.18.
98. Id. Such lack of neutrality would violate the due process right to "a fair trial by a
panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). More recently, the Supreme Court has noted that
the right to an impartial jury arises from both the sixth amendment and principles of due
process. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976). Moreover, the right is also protected
by article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. Thomas v. State, 403 So. 2d 371, 375
(Fla. 1981).
99. H. Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment (1968) (Uni-
versity of Chicago Center for Studies in Criminal Justice); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of
Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to Raise Pre-
sumptions in the Law, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970). The third study was never
published. W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (1957).
100. See unpublished studies by Ellsworth et al. cited in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28
Cal. 3d 1, 27-60, 616 P.2d 1301, 1315-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-68 (1980); Berry, Death-
Qualification and the "Fireside Induction", 5 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1982); Boehm,
Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of Psy-
chological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 734;
Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More
Likely to Convict? Some California Evidence, 3 WOODROW WILSON J.L. 11 (1980); Bronson,
On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An Em-
pirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970); Buckhout, Baker, Perl-
man & Speigel, Jury Attitudes and the Death Penalty, 3 Soc. ACTION & L. 80 (1977); Cros-
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tempted to demonstrate that juries are conviction-prone when
formed by eliminating "automatic life imprisonment" jurors have
produced extensive expert testimony concerning these studies and
related social science issues. 101 This substantial body of social sci-
ence research on the conviction-proneness issue makes it no longer
possible to regard the evidence as "too tentative and
fragmentary. "102
son, An Investigation into Certain Personality Variables among Capital Trial Jurors
(unpublished doctoral dissertation), reported in PROC. 76TH ANN. MEETING AM. PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ASS'N (1968); Girsh, The Witherspoon Question: the social sciences and the evidence,
35 NLADA BRIEFCASE 99 (1978); Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing the
Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512 (1980); Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a
"Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971);
Kadane, Juries Hearing Death Penalty Cases: Statistical Analysis of a Legal Procedure, 78
J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 544 (1983); Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of
Juror's Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 123 (1973); Moran & Comfort, Is the "Death Qualified" Juror Conviction
Prone: A Definite Maybe (1983) (unpublished draft); Rokeach & McLellan, Dogmatism and
the Death Penalty: A Reinterpretation of the Duquesne Poll Data, 8 DuQ. U. L. REV. 125
(1969-1970); Thayer, Attitudes and Personality Differences between Conventional Jurors
Who Could Return a Death Verdict and Those Who Could Not, PROC. 78TH ANN. MEETING
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N 445 (1970); White, supra note 11; White, The Constitutional In-
validity of Convictions Imposed by Death-Qualified Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176, 1178
n.12, 1185-86 (1973) (summarizing study by Louis Harris & Assoc.). The studies by Profes-
sor Ellsworth and her colleagues summarized in Hovey have been published in 8 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 1-195 (1984), a special issue dedicated to the question of death qualification and the
Hovey case, under the following titles: Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of
Death-Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Delibera-
tion, id. at 53; Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan & Thompson, The Death-Qualified Jury and the
Defense of Insanity, id. at 81; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control:
Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, id. at 31; Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth & Harring-
ton, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into
Verdicts, id. at 95.
101. E.g., Keeten v. Garrison, No. C-C-77-193-M (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984); Grigsby v.
Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd in part, modified in part, and remanded, 637
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980), on remand, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), appeal pending,
No. 83-2113-EA (8th Cir.); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (1980); see Gross, Constitutional Challenges to the Death-Qualifying Voir Dire:
Witherspoon to Hovey, in JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES §§ 3.03-.04 (B. Bonora & E.
Krauss eds. 2d ed. 1983).
102. See Keeten v. Garrison, No. C-C-77-193-M, slip op. at 3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984);
Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. at 1388; Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d, 27-60, 616
P.2d 1301, 1304-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-68 (1980); White supra note 100, 41 U. Pir. L.
REV. at 370; Winick, supra note 1, at 50-51. Several courts, on records that contained none
or few of the recent studies, have continued, however, to find insufficient evidence to estab-
lish that death-qualified juries are conviction-prone. See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582, 593-95 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); United States ex rel.
Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977);
United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350, 362-63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 854 (1972); Craig v. Wyse, 373 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1974).
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In its 1980 decision in Hovey v. Superior Court,103 the Su-
preme Court of California gave extensive consideration to these
studies. It quoted expert testimony that the studies designed to
test for conviction-proneness had "convincingly established a
strong correlation between the tendencies of jurors to vote for con-
viction and juror attitudes toward capital punishment."104 Several
studies that had been introduced into evidence relating to atti-
tudes concerning various aspects of the criminal justice system
that might be associated with conviction-proneness were found to
establish a significant relationship between death penalty opposi-
tion and pro-prosecution attitudes.1 0 5 Studies of demographic char-
acteristics of death penalty opponents concluded that exclusion of
capital punishment objectors results in the disproportionate exclu-
sion of blacks and women.10e Studies concerning juror evaluation of
evidence revealed a significant difference between death penalty
opponents and the groups remaining on capital juries in their
thresholds of reasonable doubt and in their perceptions of the
credibility of defense and prosecution witnesses. 10 7 The consistent
differences revealed by these studies between "automatic life im-
prisonment" jurors, who were excludable for cause in California,
and the groups remaining on capital juries in the state (which the
court referred to as the "Witherspoon-qualified" groups) led the
California court to find that the defendant "has shown . . . that if
a state used all four 'Witherspoon-qualified' groups in a capital
trial, the jury would not be neutral."' 0 8
The "four 'Witherspoon-qualified' groups" to which the Cali-
fornia court referred were labeled the "automatic death penalty"
group, those who will vote automatically for the death penalty; the
"favor death penalty" group, those who, although favoring the
death penalty, will not vote to impose it in every case; the "indif-
ferent" group, those who neither favor nor oppose the death pen-
103. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
104. Id. at 40, 616 P.2d at 1325, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
105. Id. at 43-54, 616 P.2d at 1326-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 153-64.
106. Id. at 54-57, 616 P.2d at 1337-39, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 164-66.
107. Id. at 57-60, 616 P.2d at 1337-40, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 166-68.
108. Id. at 68, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173; see also Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F.
Supp 1372, 1387-88 (E.D. Ark.) (finding the studies provided "sufficient evidence. . . that a
death qualified jury is more likely to find guilt than is a jury chosen without regard to
Witherspoon scruples against the death penalty. . . .[T]here appears to be a positive and
consistent relationship between the degree to which one favors capital punishment and one's
readiness to assess guilt."), aff'd in part, modified in part, and remanded, 637 F.2d 5254
(8th Cir. 1980), on remand, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (1983), appeal pending, No. 83-2113-EA (8th
Cir.).
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alty; and the "oppose death penalty" group, those who, although
opposing the death penalty, will not automatically vote against it
in every case. 09 The defendant in Hovey had contended that a
jury composed of these four groups, but excluding the "automatic
life imprisonment" group, violated his due process right to an im-
partial jury on guilt.110 Although conceding that a jury composed
of the first four groups, but excluding the fifth, "would not be neu-
tral," the California court rejected the defendant's challenge on the
basis that California is not a state that uses all four "Witherspoon-
qualified" groups.11 Rather, the court found that under California
law, the first group-the "automatic death penalty" group-is ex-
cluded for cause.11 2 As a result, the California court found that the
studies on which the defendant relied, although sufficient to estab-
lish that juries from which "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
are removed are in general not neutral on the question of guilt,
failed to make such a showing as to California juries.118 In order to
make such a showing for California juries, the studies would have
to be reanalyzed to compare the relative conviction-proneness of
the California "Witherspoon-qualified" groups-the "favor death
penalty," "indifferent," and "oppose death penalty" groups-and
the two groups excluded because they would vote automatically ei-
ther for life or for death-the "automatic life imprisonment" and
"automatic death penalty" groups.
Because "automatic death penalty" jurors also are excludable
in Florida, 1' the existing studies, if used to attack the exclusion of
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors in Florida, would suffer from
the same defect identified in Hovey. The Hovey analysis, however,
although correct, may not affect the general conclusion reached by
the studies. What is now known concerning the size of the "auto-
matic death penalty" group suggests that it may represent such a
small number of potential jurors that correcting for the failure of
the studies to take it into account will not affect the conclusions
109. 28 Cal. 3d at 20, 616 P.2d at 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
110. A sixth group, the "automatic acquittal" group, was conceded by the defendant in
Hovey to be properly excludable. Id. at 18, 616 P.2d at 1308, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
111. Id. at 67, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
112. Id. at 63-64 & n.110, 616 P.2d at 1343 & n.110, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170 & n.110.
113. Id. at 68-69, 616 P.2d at 1346, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
114. Fitzpatrick v. State, 437 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1983); Thomas v. State, 403 So. 2d 371
(Fla. 1981); see Carroll, Removing the Killers-The Touching Story of How Defense Coun-
sel Came to Love Witherspoon, 7 THE CHAMPION 1 (No. 3, April, 1983); Gross, supra note
101, at § 3.08. As I contended earlier, if "automatic life imprisonment" jurors are permitted
to serve on capital juries, so should "automatic death penalty" jurors who can be fair and
impartial in assessing guilt and innocence. See supra note 87.
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they reach.118 The California court's analysis in Hovey prompted a
number of studies designed to ascertain the size of this group.
These studies were recently reviewed in Grigsby v. Mabry, in
which the federal district court for the Eastern District of Arkan-
sas conducted an extensive hearing on the conviction-proneness is-
sue. 1 6 The court concluded, based on studies showing that from
less than one percent to no more than two percent of jurors are in
the "automatic death penalty" group," 7 that the number of such
115. See Gross, supra note 101, at §§ 3.03[51[d][ii], 3.05[2]; Kadane, After Hovey: A
Note on Taking Account of the Automatic Death Penalty Jurors, 8 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 115
(1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that there are likely to be few such jurors.
See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49 (1980) ("it is undeniable ... that ["automatic death
penalty"] jurors will be few indeed as compared with those excluded because of scruples
against capital punishment").
116. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), appeal pending, No. 83-
2113-EA (8th Cir.). In a 1980 opinion, the court, on petition for habeas corpus, found that
the state trial judge had improperly refused a continuance to a defendant convicted of capi-
tal murder who had sought an opportunity to show that a "death qualified" jury was biased
on guilt. 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark. 1980). On appeal, the circuit court agreed that the
defendant was entitled to a hearing, but found that the hearing should be held in federal
rather than state court. 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980). An extensive hearing was thereafter
held on the conviction-proneness issue, followed by the court's recent decision accepting the
defendant's contentions.
117. 569 F. Supp. at 1307, reviewing Arkansas Archival Study (1981) (less than 1% in
Arkansas sample were "automatic death penalty" jurors); Jurow, supra note 100 (2% in
New York sample were "automatic death penalty" jurors); The 1981 Harris Study, L. Harris
& Assoc., Inc., Study No. 814002 (Jan. 1981) (less than 1% in national sample were "auto-
matic death penalty" jurors), These studies are also analyzed in Berry, supra note 100, at
25-30, as are three additional studies reaching similar conclusions concerning the size of the
"automatic death penalty". group. See Berry & Butler, Distributions of Death-Penalty Atti-
tudes: An Arkansas Sample (unpublished), discussed in Berry, supra note 100, at 27-28 (1%
in Arkansas sample were "automatic death penalty" jurors); Cowan & Thompson, Death
Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Automatic Death Penalty Juror (unpub-
lished, 1981), discussed in Berry, supra note 100, at 28 (none in California sample were
"automatic death penalty" jurors); Hamilton, Individual Differences in Ascriptions of Re-
sponsibility, Guilt and Appropriate Punishment, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (G. Ber-
mont, C. Nemeth & N. Vidmar eds. 1976), discussed in Berry, supra note 100, at 27 (1% in
New York sample were "automatic death penalty" jurors). The Grigsby court dismissed as
flawed a telephone survey conducted by one of the state's expert witnesses that purported to
show that 33.3% in a California sample were "automatic death penalty" jurors. Grigsby v.
Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at 1307-08 (study by Dr. Shure). Rather than inquiring whether the
participants in the survey would always vote for the death penalty following conviction,
regardless of the evidence, this study described a specific, heinous case and asked partici-
pants if they would vote for death in the described case. Moreover, the court questioned the
representativeness of the area surveyed-a wealthy, almost all white, conservative area in
Los Angeles in which several highly publicized crimes had occurred a short time before the
survey. In addition, the court noted that Dr. Shure had "acknowledged potential errors and
omissions in his study," did not "view it as definitive," and conceded that the number of
"automatic death penalty" jurors shown was "inflated." Id. at 1308; see also Berry, supra
note 100, at 26-27 ("Shure's procedures . . . may have been seriously flawed" and "the re-
sults of other studies suggest that Shure's results are not at all representative").
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jurors is "negligible" when compared to that of "automatic life im-
prisonment" jurors,"8 which the court found represented between
eleven percent and seventeen percent of those eligible for jury ser-
vice." 9 The exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors,
therefore, will not be offset by the exclusion of "automatic death
penalty" jurors. As a result, the general conclusion recognized by
the Hovey court-that juries formed by excluding "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors are conviction-prone when compared to the
typical jury utilized in non-capital cases remains intact notwith-
standing the defect in the studies identified by the California
court. Following its extensive review of the studies, the Grigsby
court thus became the first to accept the contention that removal
for cause of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors results in a capi-
tal jury "uncommonly predisposed to favor the prosecution, a jury
'organized to convict.' ,120
The extensive social science evidence now available on the
conviction-proneness issue cannot be ignored. At a minimum, these
studies raise a substantial doubt concerning the neutrality of capi-
tal juries in Florida .with regard to guilt, and thus make the exclu-
sion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors constitutionally sus-
118. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at 1308; accord Keeten v. Garrison, No. C-C-77-
193-M, slip op. at 26 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984) (relying on Dr. Kadane's testimony in a
related case for the conclusion that "exclusion of potential jurors who will vote to impose
the death penalty in every capital case does not correct the biasing effects of excluding the
much larger group of potential jurors who will never vote to impose the death penalty in any
case").
119. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at 1285; see also Arkansas Archival Study, supra
note 117, described in Berry, supra note 100, at 28-29 (13.25% in Arkansas study of tran-
scribed voir dires in capital cases were removed for cause as "automatic life imprisonment"
jurors); Berry & Butler, supra note 117, described in Berry, supra note 100, at 27-28 (10%
in Arkansas sample were "automatic life imprisonment" jurors); Ellsworth & Fitzgerald,
Due Process vs. Crime Control: The Impact of Death Qualification on Jury Attitudes
(1979) (prepublication draft), summarized in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 50-54,
616 P.2d 1301, 1333-37, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 161-64 (1980) (15.2% in 1979 survey conducted
in Alameda County, California were "automatic life imprisonment" jurors); Field Poll of
Californians, cited in Kadane, supra note 115, at 116 (11.6% in 1981 statewide poll con-
ducted in California were "automatic life imprisonment" jurors); Hamilton, supra note 117,
described in Berry, supra note 100, at 27 (35% in New York sample were "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors); Jurow, supra note 100, described in Berry, supra note 100, at 18
(10% in New York study were "automatic life imprisonment" jurors).
120. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at 1304. Grigsby was recently followed in Keeten v.
Garrison, No. C-C-77-193-M (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984). The expert testimony in Grigsby,
endorsed in Keeten, concluded that the exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
"results in a ten per cent higher conviction rate than would normally be expected to occur in
close cases, i.e., ones in which the evidence is not strong enough to produce a clear majority
vote for conviction on the first ballot." Keeten v. Garrison, slip op. at 49.
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pect. 12 ' These doubts concerning jury impartiality on guilt upset
the careful balance struck in Witherspoon between the defendant's
interest in jury impartiality and the state's interests in convicting
the guilty and effectuating its capital punishment scheme. Under
the Florida "trifurcated" procedure, neither state interest would be
frustrated by the inclusion of these jurors. Because the trial judge
decides sentence without being bound by a jury recommendation,
he may impose capital punishment in an appropriate case even if
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors remain on the capital jury
and vote, as inevitably they will, for life imprisonment.'22 Indeed,
whatever guidance the judge is provided by the jury's recommen-
dation on the life or death question is still provided by a jury
whose members include "automatic life imprisonment" jurors. 123
Since voir dire questioning will identify these jurors as being "au-
tomatic life imprisonment" jurors, the judge will be aware of the
number of such jurors sitting on the capital jury and will be able to
give appropriate weight to the jury's advisory vote on sentence.
Moreover, inclusion on capital juries of "automatic life impris-
onment" jurors will not frustrate the state's interest in convicting
the guilty, as by definition "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
can fairly assess guilt or innocence notwithstanding their opposi-
tion to the death penalty. However, two decisions by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, and one by the First District Court of Ap-
peal of Florida, expressing an inclination to follow the Fifth
121. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 17 n.37, 616 P.2d at 1308 n.37, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 135 n.37 (1980) (defendant raising conviction-proneness argument would only have
to establish a "substantial doubt" about whether resulting juries are neutral with respect to
guilt); White, supra note 11, at 381-82; cf. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (ap-
plying standard in sixth amendment context). These studies provide a strong inference of
conviction-proneness. See id. (studies considering effects of reducing jury size from 12 or 10
to a smaller number relied on for determining consequences of reducing jury size from six to
five).
122. Even in cases in which, under the existing practice, "automatic life imprisonment"
jurors were removed from such juries, Florida judges have imposed death in a substantial
number of cases despite jury recommendations of life. See supra note 68.
123. The Florida advisory jury provides the judge with little in the way of guidance
other than informing him of whether the conscience of the community demands the death
penalty. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text. The jury does not make specific
factual findings, but merely reports its recommendation by majority vote, a vote the numeri-
cal breakdown of which is frequently not even revealed to the trial judge. See Dobbert v.
State, 409 So. 2d 1053, 1058 (Fla. 1982):
[I]n most cases, the trial judge and this court know only that a majority of the
jury has recommended life or death. Nothing more is required because it is not
material what number of the majority of the jury recommends a sentence of
death or recommends a sentence of life.
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Circuit's reasoning, reject this analysis." 4 The Fifth Circuit's view
is that a jury that includes "automatic life imprisonment" jurors,
rather than being neutral, might be biased in favor of the defen-
dant, thereby denying the state its right to an impartial jury. Un-
derlying these concerns appears to be the suspicion that "auto-
matic life imprisonment" jurors may actually be "automatic
acquittal" jurors, although they swear at voir dire that they are
not. This suspicion alone could not justify the exclusion of these
jurors and still be consistent with the explicit holding of Wither-
spoon and its progeny that the factual basis for a venireperson's
exclusion on account of death penalty attitudes must be "unmis-
takably clear."' 25 Indeed, if the Fifth Circuit's view is correct pros-
ecutors presumably should be able to interrogate venirepersons in
non-capital cases (assuming that their asserted defense-proneness
would apply there as well) concerning their views on the death
penalty, and remove for cause those who could never impose it on
the ground that they are acquittal-prone. Nowhere, however, is
this allowed.'26 Moreover, the concern expressed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit appears inconsistent with Witherspoon's central holding that
exclusion of "oppose death penalty" jurors-those who oppose the
death penalty but who will not automatically vote against it in
every case-results in an unconstitutionally death-prone jury. As
applied to Witherspoon's facts, the Fifth Circuit approach would
124. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 181 (1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 594,
594-96 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); Nettles v. State, 409 So. 2d 85 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982).
125. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 515-16 n.9, 522-23 n.21; accord Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38, 44 (1980); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) ("Unless a venireman states unam-
biguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no
matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that is his position." Id. at
265 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516 n.9)); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482
(1969); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 955 (11th Cir. 1983) (venireperson's responses must be
"unequivocal"); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (venirepersons'
statements must constitute "unequivocal avowals disqualifying her under either aspect of
Witherspoon's two-pronged test," id. at 397-98); Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir.
1970) (doubts concerning venireperson's ability should be resolved against exclusion).
126. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at 1310-11 (E.D. Ark. 1983) ("no one has yet ar-
gued that either those strongly in favor of the death penalty or those strongly opposed to it
should be excluded in cases where the death penalty would never be an issue, e.g., in a
simple robbery case. Indeed, it is assumed that no inquiry into such attitudes would even be
permitted in such non-capital cases, and this is as it should be. ... ); Haney, supra note
100, at 514 (1980) ("[T]he process ... [of] 'death qualification' . . . is unique to capital
cases. In no other instance are prospective jurors systematically queried about their atti-
tudes toward a particular legal punishment and then excluded, as a matter of law, depend-
ing on how they answer.").
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presumably call for affirmance of Witherspoon's death sentence on
the basis that juries including "oppose death penalty" jurors are
more life imprisonment-prone than juries excluding all death-scru-
pled jurors, and therefore biased in favor of the defendant. But
Witherspoon explicitly rejected this contention in favor of a jury
that the Court deemed more impartial than the one which excludes
all death penalty objectors. Witherspoon thus suggests that if a
capital jury resembling the jury that sits in the typical non-capital
case-universally regarded as fair and impartial-is found to be
significantly less conviction-prone than a death-qualified jury, then
the latter would be constitutionally suspect as a trier of the defen-
dant's guilt. The Fifth Circuit's doubts, therefore, seem ill-
considered.12 7
The Florida cases that reject the contention that exclusion of
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors is unconstitutional do so
without analysis, citing the Supreme Court's disclaimer that noth-
ing in its Witherspoon opinion precludes exclusion of this group. 128
But Witherspoon was decided in the context of a unitary capital
trial process, and its reservation of the issue there certainly should
not be read to bar consideration of the constitutionality of exclud-
ing these jurors in a context in which not only is there a bifurcated
trial process, but a "trifurcated" one in which the trial judge
makes the sentencing decision without being bound by any jury
recommendation on sentence. In this context, the Witherspoon
disclaimer concerning "automatic life imprisonment" jurors, as
well as the Court's more recent dicta in Adams v. Texas, which can
be read as approving their removal,12' should be rethought. Partic-
ularly in view of the serious concerns presented by the social sci-
ence research dealing with the conviction-proneness of capital ju-
ries formed by excluding this group, the defendant's interes't in an
\
127. For further criticism of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, see Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F.
Supp. 1372, 1387 n.19 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd in part, modified in part, and remanded, 637 F.2d
525 (8th Cir. 1980), on remand, 569 F. Supp. at 1311-13 (E.D. Ark. 1983), appeal pending,
No. 83-2113-EA (8th Cir.). Hovey, 28 Cal. 3d at 19 n.41, 616 P.2d 1301, 1309 n.41, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 128, 136 n.41 (1980); Gross, supra note 101, at § 3.04; White, supra note 11, at 374-75.
128. See cases cited supra note 8.
129. 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980); see supra note 45. Even if the Court's language in Adams
can be read as approving the removal of these jurors in a bifurcated capital case, this dicta
would seem inapplicable to a "trifurcated" case. The Texas statute in Adams provided for a
bifurcated trial in which the judge is required to impose sentence based on the jury's an-
swers to statutory questions. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b), (c), (e) (Supp. 1980).
Although the judge in Texas actually imposes the penalty, he is bound by the jury's recom-
mendation, and it is therefore appropriate to classify Texas as a state in which the jury
makes the penalty determination. See Gillers, supra note 12, at 14 & n.14.
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impartial jury on guilt argues strongly in favor of the inclusion of
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors on capital juries. And in a
system like Florida's, involving a "trifurcated" proceeding in which
the trial judge makes the determination of sentence without being
bound by a jury recommendation, inclusion of these jurors would
not frustrate the state's concededly significant interests in the con-
viction of the guilty and in the imposition of the death penalty in
an appropriate case. When properly analyzed, the defendant's in-
terest in having such jurors is significant, and the state's interest in
excluding them is scant to non-existent.
The exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors in Flor-
ida should be held unconstitutional. The serious doubts concerning
the neutrality of remaining juries and the lack of justification for
the practice compel this conclusion. 30 Capital defendants no less
than defendants in noncapital cases deserve juries that are neutral
on guilt.18' Indeed, concern for the reliability of the guilt determi-
nation process is greater in capital cases."3 2 Absent justification,
130. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239-44 (1978) (empirical studies concerning
behavior of six-person juries and psychological studies of small groups generally held to
"raise substantial doubt about the reliability and appropriate representativeness of panels
smaller than six," id. at 239; reduction of jury size below six held to impair the purpose and
functioning of the criminal jury in violation of the sixth amendment and due process where
asserted state justifications (financial savings and reduced court time) were found insignifi-
cant); White, supra note 11, at 376-405 (empirical evidence demonstrating death-qualified
jury's conviction-proneness compared to neutral jury stronger than studies relied on in Bal-
lew; state interests in death-qualification less than those in Ballew).
131. "It is, of course, settled that a State may not entrust the determination of whether
a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal 'organized to convict.'" Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510,
521 (1968) (quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947)). See Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927).
132. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 643 (1980) (statutory prohibition on in-
structing juries in capital cases on lesser included offenses "introduce(d) a level of uncer-
tainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated in a capital
case." Because of the significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and
lesser punishments, "we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the relia-
bility of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to rules that dimin-
ish the reliability of the guilt determination." Id. at 638.) The Supreme Court has fre-
quently insisted on more in the way of due process in capital cases. Compare Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) ("when a defendant is deprived of the presence and
assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at
least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic") with Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 274 (1967) (although post-indictment lineup is a critical stage for sixth amend-
ment right-to-counsel purposes, resulting in a per se exlcusionary rule for testimony con-
cerning lineup identifications made without presence of counsel, such testimony, at least in
non-capital cases, is subject to the harmless error rule); compare Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932) (capital defendant unable to employ counsel or make his own defense had
due process right to assigned counsel) with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (refusal to
appoint counsel for robbery suspect held not to violate due process); see Winick, supra note
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there is no constitutional basis for juries that are more conviction-
prone in capital cases than the juries in noncapital cases.' 13 At a
minimum, these substantial constitutional concerns about the neu-
trality of death-qualified capital juries argue strongly for resolving
the ambiguity in the Florida statutory scheme concerning chal-
lenges for cause against the removal of "automatic life imprison-
ment" jurors.
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Representative Jury on
Guilt
The concern for jury representativeness reflected in the sixth
amendment right to a jury selected from "a fair cross-section of
the community"' 34 provides further support for the inclusion on
capital juries of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors. Sixth
amendment cross-section cases, as well as prior cases dealing with
jury representativeness that were decided under the equal protec-
tion clause or through the Supreme Court's supervisory powers
over the lower federal courts, involved jury selection methods used
to form the jury pool-the venire from which jurors are selected by
a process of elimination occurring through exercise of jury chal-
lenges."' These cases consider the cross-section requirement vio-
lated if the jury pool is made up solely from "special segments of
the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the
pool.""' Although the cases involve the validity of jury selection
practices that affect the composition of the jury pool, in a related
context I have previously argued that the cross-section require-
ment applies not only to venires but also to actual juries and that
jury challenge practices should accordingly be subject to scrutiny
under the sixth amendment cross-section requirement. 3 ' As a re-
1, at 19-20.
133. Not only would this violate the sixth amendment/due process right to an impartial
jury, but in view of the heightened concern for reliability in the factfinding process in capi-
tal cases, see supra note 132, it would seem to violate equal protection as well. See Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 n.10 (1972) (equal protection violated where "a State has ac-
corded bedrock procedural rights to some, but not to all similarly situated"); see, e.g., Jack-
son v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (violation of equal protection to commit permanently
incompetent criminal defendants pursuant to different standards and procedures than civil
committees).
134. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). See generally J. Van Dyke, supra
note 1, at 45-83 (1977); Winick, supra note 1, at 62-77.
135. E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217 (1946); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); see Winick, supra note 1, at 62-63.
136. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
137. See Winick, supra note 1, at 63-66; see also Gross, supra note 101, at § 3.05[2].
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sult, if the removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors for
cause in Florida results in capital juries that exclude "large, dis-
tinctive groups" in the community,"8 then absent justification,
such exclusion would violate the cross-section requirement.
The United States Supreme Court has defined the elements of
proof necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-
Two courts have expressly so held in the very context under consideration-the exclusion
for cause in capital cases of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors. See Keeten v. Garrison,
No. C-C-77-193-M (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984) (exclusion for cause in capital case of "auto-
matic life imprisonment" group scrutinized under cross-section requirement); Grigsby v.
Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1376-85 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd in part, modified in part, and re-
manded, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980), on remand, 569 F. Supp. 1273, at 1285-86 (E.D. Ark.
1983) (same); see also People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) (peremptory challenge of six of seven blacks on venire scrutinized under sixth amend-
ment cross-section requirement), overruled on other grounds by, People v. Williams, 97 Ill.
2d 252, 454 N.E.2d 220 (1983) (use of peremptory challenges in single case not subject to
challenge); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-78, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 903 (1978) (peremptory challenge of all blacks on venire to produce all-white jury scru-
tinized under state constitution cross-section requirement); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 477-92, 387 N.E.2d 499, 510-12 (peremptory challenge of 12 of 13 blacks on ve-
nire scrutinized under state.constitution; "judgment of his peers" interpreted to mandate a
jury "that represents a cross-section of community concepts") (quoting Commonwealth v.
Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 512, 246 N.E.2d 433, 435 (1969)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979);
cf. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (scrutinizing under the cross-section requirement
a statutory reduction in jury size). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested, in
dicta, that the sixth amendment cross-section requirement may apply only to venires, and
not to actual juries. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 181 (1982). But see Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at 1285 ("such a contention
flies in the face of the policies underlying the cross-section requirement and, if accepted,
would provide a device for avoiding the effects thereof."); Winick, supra note 1, at 63-66
(criticizing this approach as inconsistent with the policies underlying the cross-section
requirement).
The United States Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to resolve the issue,
although in an unusual series of opinions, five of the justices noted the importance of the
question. McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983). In a dissent to the denial of certio-
rari, Justices Marshall and Brennan contended that the cross-section right
is rendered meaningless if the State is permitted to utilize several peremptory
challenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury. . . . The desired interaction of a
cross-section of the community does not take place within the venire; it is only
effectuated by the jury that is selected and sworn to try the issues. The system-
atic exclusion of prospective jurors because of their race is therefore unconstitu-
tional at any stage of the jury selection process.
Id. at 2442. In a highly unusual "opinion . . . respecting the denial of" certiorari, three
additional justices noted that their vote to deny review did not reflect disagreement with the
dissent's "appraisal of the importance of the underlying issue," but merely their belief "that
further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications of the problem by
other courts will enable us to deal with the issue more wisely at a later date." Id. at 2438
(opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., and Powell, J.); see also Gilliard v. Missis-
sippi, 104 S. Ct. 40 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari, joined by Bren-
nan, J.).
138. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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section requirement as follows:
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be ex-
cluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group . . . is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process."' 0
An identifiable group which must not be excluded is defined as one
with a distinct attitude or "decisional outlook." 140 I have previ-
ously argued that the class of jurors with reservations about capital
punishment should be deemed a "distinctive" group or "cognizable
class" within the meaning of the cross-section requirement.'41 If
death-scrupled jurors are considered a cognizable class, a defen-
dant attacking exclusion for cause of "automatic life imprison-
ment" jurors would have to demonstrate that juries resulting from
this exclusionary practice contain so few death-scrupled jurors that
the representation of this group "is not fair and reasonable in rela-
tion to the number of such persons in the community .... .
139. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
140. United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905
(1973) (quoting King v. United States, 346 F.2d 123, 124 (1st Cir. 1965); see also Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 230 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("a different out-
look psychologically and economically," "a different sense of justice, and a different concep-
tion of a juror's responsibility"; United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.),
af'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 973 (1973) ("a common thread
which runs through the groups, a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experience"); Ru-
bio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 98, 593 P.2d 595, 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. 737, 737 (1979) (a
"unifying viewpoint," "a common perspective," "a common social or psychological outlook
on human events"); Winick, supra note 1, at 66-69.
141. See Winick, supra note 1, at 69-73. Those with conscientious scruples against capi-
tal punishment form a coherent and sizable group within the community. Public opinion
polls indicate that approximately 25% of the American public opposes the death penalty.
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1981, 209-12 (T. Flanagan, D. van Alstyne &
M. Gottfredson eds. 1982). Not only are death-scrupled jurors sufficiently numerous to meet
the cognizability requirement, but the group is cohesive, possessing a common perspective
on the death penalty, an attitude that social science studies have shown is related to other
social and legal attitudes and to personality variables. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra
note 100 (discussing studies and presenting new data); Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion
and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1245, 1258-62 (1974) (discussing studies); Winick,
supra note 1, at 71-72 (same). These studies support the conclusion that death penalty ob-
jectors are attitudinally distinct from nonobjectors and therefore should be considered a
cognizable class for sixth amendment purposes. Winick, supra note 1, at 72-73.
142. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). This demonstration of under-
representation is performed by using statistical probability theory that compares "the pro-
portion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as ... jurors,
over a significant period of time." Id. at 357. Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977);
see id. at 496-97 n.17 (illustrating application of standard deviation analysis; prima facie
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Whether resulting capital juries contain a sufficient representation
of death-scrupled jurors is thus an empirical question requiring
statistical proof, which may vary from district to district and from
time to time.4 8
case established "if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is
greater than two or three standard deviations"); see D.W. BARNES, STATISTICS As PROOF:
FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTrrAT E EVIDENCE 75-142 (1983); Winick, supra note 1, at 23 &
nn.86-89. Applying this methodology to the data reported in my prior study of capital jury
selection practices in a Florida district reveals a substantial underrepresentation of death-
scrupled jurors on the juries selected during the five-year period studied. Although 147
(13.2%) of the venirepersons examined expressed opposition to the death penalty, see
Winick, supra note 1, at 30 (table 1), only 12 (2.8%) of the jurors and alternates selected in
the 30 cases considered were death-scrupled. See Winick, supra note 1, at 28-31. Of the 135
jurors that were removed, 4 were removed by defense challenge (3 by peremptories and 1 for
cause), 67 were removed for cause by prosecutors, 24 were excused for cause by the court
without motion, and 40 were removed by prosceutorial peremptory challenge. Winick, supra
note 1, at 30-31 (tables 1-2). The chances of 12 or fewer scrupled venirepersons being se-
lected at random is calculated at approximately 29 in one hundred billion (.000,000,000,29),
a result that is statistically significant to an astronomical degree (6.25 standard deviations).
See Winick, supra note 1, at 73-74. The accuracy of the 13.2% figure as representing the
portion of the community opposed to capital punishment during this period is confirmed by
an independent survey of substantially the same area conducted in 1979 which revealed that
15% of those interviewed opposed the death penalty. Research Department, Florida Pub-
lishing Company, What Residents of Metro Jacksonville Think About Capital Punishment
(unpublished, 1979). See Winick, supra note 1, at 70 n.262.
143. If a defendant in a particular district can demonstrate substantial under-
representation of death-scrupled jurors, then, assuming they constitute a cognizable class, a
prima facie case of violation of the cross-section requirement will have been established. In
sixth amendment cross-section cases, "systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an in-
fringement of the defendant's interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross-section.
There is no need to show particularized bias against the defendant. The only remaining
question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringement." Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979). The state bears the burden of justifying the underrepresenta-
tive result "by showing attainment of a fair cross-section to be incompatible with a signifi-
cant state interest." Id. at 368-69; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) (the
sixth amendment right to a representative jury "cannot be overcome on merely rational
grounds"). Moreover, the significant state interests asserted must be "manifestly and pri-
marily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process. . . that result in the dispro-
portionate exclusion of a distinctive group." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 367-68.
The state certainly has a significant interest in excluding one group of death-scrupled
jurors-the "automatic acquittal" jurors-as inclusion of this group would frustrate the
state's interest in convicting the guilty. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978). The
justifications for excluding "automatic life imprisonment" jurors are less clear, however. In
states in which the jury makes the sentencing decision in capital cases, the state's interest in
effectuating its capital punishment scheme would be frustrated if these jurors were required
to participate in the determination of sentence. In such states, however, a "less restrictive
alternative" to wholesale exclusion of this group exists that makes it possible to accomodate
this state interest with the defendant's interests in an impartial and representative jury.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has suggested such a possibility-a bifurcated
trial, using one jury to decide guilt, on which "automatic life imprisonment" jurors would
serve, and another to fix punishment, from which such jurors would be removed. Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 610, 520 n.18 (1968); see Winick, supra note 1, at 56-61. Although
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It is also possible to conceptualize a subset of death-scrupled
jurors-the "automatic life imprisonment" jurors-as themselves
constituting a cognizable class."" Indeed, two recent federal dis-
trict court decisions so hold.'1 5 In the early stages of the Grigsby
litigation, the court had rejected a cross-section challenge to the
exclusion for cause of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors in cap-
ital cases on the basis that death-scrupled jurors who will not auto-
matically vote against death in every case-"oppose death pen-
alty" jurors-were not so excludable, and would represent the
perspectives of the excluded group. 14 After remand and a lengthy
hearing, however, the court reversed itself, finding that the social
science evidence demonstrated that "automatic life imprisonment"
jurors "are different and distinctive" from "oppose death penalty"
jurors, and that this evidence "undercuts the idea that the mildly
scrupled jurors who are not excluded under Witherspoon would
adequately represent the attitudes of those who are excluded
under Witherspoon.""147 Not only did the court find that "auto-
matic life imprisonment" jurors have a highly distinctive attitude
this alternative approach would involve added costs and possible delays, the state interests
in avoiding these may not be sufficiently "significant" to justify the impact on representa-
tiveness and impartiality caused by the exclusion from the jury that assesses guilt of "auto-
matic life imprisonment" jurors. See White, supra note 11, at 399-401; Winick, supra note
1, at 55-61. The court in Grigsby v. Mabry recently accepted this contention, ruling that the
bifurcated trial alternative suggested in Witherspoon was constitutionally required. Accord
Keeten v. Garrison, No. C-C-77-193-M (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984) (bifurcated trial alternative
required; additional costs found "trivial compared with the human rights and constitutional
issues at stake," id., slip op. at 4).
In Florida, the state interests in removing "automatic life imprisonment" jurors is even
less than in states with more typical capital sentencing statutes under which the jury deter-
mines sentence. Indeed, in Florida the costs and delays of impanelling a second jury to
determine sentence are unnecessary. Under Florida's "trifurcated" process the judge decides
sentence and the jury can play its essential role of expressing the "conscience of the commu-
nity" on the life or death question even if it contains jurors who can never recommend
death. See notes 65-69, 76-93, supra, and accompanying text. The exclusion of these jurors
in Florida, therefore, cannot be justified as "incompatible with a significant state interest."
439 U.S. at 368-69. Assuming that the number of such "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
removed for cause in the district in question is not de minimis, see note 119, supra (studies
finding 10% or more of community were "automatic life imprisonment" jurors), the practice
should be held to violate the sixth amendment.
144. For example, although Christians would certainly constitute a cognizable class, see
State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965), so would Catholics. See Juarez v. State,
102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925).
145. Keeten v. Garrison, No. C-C-77-193-M (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984); Grigsby v. Ma-
bry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983); contra People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 803 (Cal. 1983) (plurality opinion).
146. 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
147. 569 F. Supp. at 1283-93.
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or decisional outlook, but it also found that the group was of sub-
stantial size both nationally and within Arkansas, "ranging be-
tween 11 % and 17 % of those eligible for jury service."14 The court
thus concluded that "automatic life imprisonment" jurors were a
cognizable class for sixth amendment purposes. As no representa-
tive of this class would remain on the capital jury after voir dire,
given their systematic exclusion for cause, the court held that a
prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement was estab-
lished. 49 And as the court found the state's interest in excluding
this group from the guilt determination process to be insufficient
to justify "the destruction of the representativeness of the juries
which result from death qualification," a sixth amendment viola-
tion was found.18 0 Grigsby was recently followed by the federal dis-
trict court for the Western District of North Carolina, which in
Keeten v. Garrison relied on the same social science evidence to
find that exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors vio-
lated the cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.15
Whether or not the exclusion for cause of "automatic life im-
prisonment" jurors in Florida capital cases results in substantial
underrepresentation of death-scrupled jurors sufficient to violate
the sixth amendment, or whether or not "automatic life imprison-
148. Id. at 1285; see also supra note 119.
149. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at 1286.
150. Id. at 1321.
151. No. C-C-77-193-M (Jan. 12, 1984), slip op. at 34-45. The court found that "auto-
matic life imprisonment" jurors constitute a "distinctive group" in the community, esti-
mated to constitute 8% to 23% of the population of the United States. Id. at 37. These
persons, the court found, "share a unique set of attitudes toward the criminal justice system
which separate them as a group not only from persons who favor the death penalty, but also
from persons who are generally opposed to the death penalty, but are willing to consider it
in some cases." Id. at 38-39.
The Supreme Court of California recently rejected this conclusion in a plurality opinion
joined by only three of the six justices participating. People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 803 (1983) (Broussard, J., concurring, joined by Mosk and Richardson, J.J.). Without
discussing the social science evidence, the plurality opinion concluded that "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors-a "class of persons united only by their determination to vote auto-
matically against the death penalty-a class divided in all else, including even their reason
for refusing to consider the death penalty"--:do not comprise "a distinctive, self-conscious
group" and hence are not cognizable for sixth amendment purposes. 673 P.2d at 692, 197
Cal. Rptr. at 815. A dissent by the Chief Justice, joined by another of the justices, criticized
the plurality's assumptions concerning the distinctiveness of this class as "flatly contra-
dicted by the Hovey decision and by the consistent results of each of the two dozen studies
discussed therein." Id. at 711, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (Bird, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rey-
noso, J.); see also id. at 711-14, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 834-37. The sixth justice participating
concurred in the decision on alternate grounds, without reaching the cognizability issue. Id.
at 709, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (Kaus, J., concurring).
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ment" jurors themselves constitute a cognizable class,152 the prac-
tice is certainly inconsistent with the value of jury representative-
ness reflected in the cross-section requirement. As a result, a
second constitutional consideration must weigh strongly against
permitting the exclusion for cause of "automatic life imprison-
ment" jurors.
C. The Eighth Amendment Interest in Jury
Representativeness on Sentence
The sixth amendment concern for jury representativeness is
heightened in the capital trial context by the eighth amendment
values that infuse the Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon.
In Witherspoon the Court noted that a jury from which all death
penalty opponents are excluded cannot perform the task de-
manded of it by states that leave the life or death decision to jury
discretion. For where state law leaves capital punishment to the
discretion of the jury, "a jury that must choose between life im-
prisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must
do nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on
the ultimate question of life or death.' 1 53 A full measure of com-
munity participation in this vital decision is thus crucial.
In assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment, the
Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the
role of the jury in capital sentencing as an indication of community
values.1 54 Indeed, the Court has relied on the conduct of capital
152. The Supreme Court of Florida has summarily rejected the related contention that
the cross-section requirement mandates inclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
on the guilt phase of a capital trial and their replacement by alternates at the sentence-
recommendation phase. Maggard v. State, 399 So. 2d 973, 976 (Fla. 1981); Gafford v. State,
387 So. 2d 333, 335-36 (Fla. 1980); Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 1978). The court's
summary discussion of this contention, however, did not consider whether death-scrupled
jurors or a subset thereof constituted a cognizable class within the meaning of the sixth
amendment.
153. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
154. See supra note 25; Gillers, supra note 12, at 69-72. The Supreme Court has never
determined whether the eighth amendment requires jury participation in the decision to
impose the death penalty. The Court's statement in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(plurality opinion), that it "has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally re-
quired," id. at 252, is dictum. See Gillers, supra note 12, at 6 n.22. Because the death sen-
tence in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1968), was reversed on other grounds, the Court
found it unnecessary to address the defendant's assertion of a constitutional right to a jury
determination of penalty in capital cases. 438 U.S. at 609 n.16. Various members of the
Court, however, have expressed the view that the Constitution does not require a jury in
capital cases. See Westbrook v. Balkcom, 449 U.S. 999 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For an
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juries acting as reflectors of community sentiments on the death
penalty question in its assessment of various capital punishment
statutes. For example, in invalidated mandatory capital punish-
ment statutes under the eighth amendment, the Court stressed the
reluctance of American juries to convict a significant portion of
those charged under such mandatory statutes as indicating a repu-
diation of automatic death sentences. 5 The Court similarly relied
on the sentencing decisions of capital juries for its conclusion that
capital punishment for rape" ' and for felony murder 57 has been
rejected by the conscience of the community and is therefore
unconstitutional.
The eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ments is an evolving constitutional norm that reflects society's
changing moral judgments concerning the limits of appropriate
punishment. " Jury selection practices which permit the system-
atic removal of a substantial proportion of death-scrupled jurors
have the effect of freezing the procedure for imposing death
sentences in a structure that would prevent the progressive evolu-
tion of constitutional norms over time, posing a threat to basic
eighth amendment values. " Jury representativeness in the capital
context is thus mandated not only by the sixth amendment, but by
eighth amendment concerns as well. The Supreme Court in
Witherspoon recognized the critical importance of representative
juries in capital cases by stating that "one of the most important
functions any jury can perform" in deciding between life and death
"is to maintain a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system-a link without which a determination of
punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency
extensive argument in support of such a constitutional right, see Gillers, supra note 12, at
39-74.
155. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
156. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1977).
157. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795-96 (1982) (invalidating statute authorizing
capital punishment for felony murder where defendant did not commit the homicide, at-
tempt to kill, or intend that the killing take place).
158. As early as 1910, the Court stated that the eighth amendment is "progressive" and
"may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). Since the language of the prohibition is not
precise and its scope is not static, "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
159. See Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 294-96 (1975)
(analyzing Witherspoon as mandating a "structure through which eighth amendment prin-
ciples would be linked to community sentiments"); Winick, supra note 1, at 80.
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that mark the progress of a maturing society.' "180 A jury can per-
form this function only if it fairly represents community attitudes
on capital punishment.
Thus, eighth amendment values strongly counsel against the
removal for cause of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors. The
systematic elimination of this sub-group of death-scrupled jurors
biases jury composition in capital cases, resulting in a distorted ex-
aggeration of the community's willingness to impose the death
penalty."' Advisory opinions on sentence rendered by such juries
may thus mislead sentencing judges as to whether the "conscience
of the community" demands the extreme penalty in particular
cases and "creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. 1 62 If,
juries are to effectively express the community conscience in their
advisory role in the second stage of Florida's "trifurcated" capital
trial process, 6 ' the opinions of "automatic life imprisonment" ju-
rors must be heard.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the typical practice in Flor-
ida of excusing for cause jurors whose beliefs about capital punish-
ment render them unable to recommend death, but which do not
interfere with their ability to make a fair assessment of guilt, may
not be authorized by state law, and even if authorized, is unconsti-
tutional."6' The cases upholding this practice, reflexively citing
Witherspoon, do not analyze the substantially open state law ques-
160. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). This language was subsequently quoted with approval in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976), and in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976).
See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970), where the Court, in dicta, noted that
no state provides for fewer than twelve jurors in capital cases, and interpreted this fact as
reflecting an "implicit recognition of the value of the larger body as a means of legitimating
society's decision to impose the death penalty."
161. This is true in Florida even though "automatic death penalty" jurors are also re-
moved for cause, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, in view of the empirical evi-
dence suggesting the substantially larger size of the "automatic life imprisonment" group in
the community. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; notes 117-19 and accompanying
text.
162. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1976) (Burger, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
163. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
164. Even if the Florida courts should construe the statutory provisions dealing with
challenge for cause to authorize removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors, the consti-
tutional problems I have identified, which constitute "limitation[s] on the State's power to
exclude," Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980), would independently demand an end to
this practice.
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tions, nor the troubling constitutional difficulties presented. Ac-
cordingly, Florida courts should reexamine this issue.
The removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors raises
grave concerns about the prosecution-proneness of resulting juries,
posing a serious threat to the sixth amendment/due process right
of capital defendants to an impartial jury on guilt. In addition, the
practice distorts the representative character of capital juries by
eliminating a significant proportion of those members of the com-
munity who oppose capital punishment. This raises serious
problems under the sixth amendment requirement that juries re-
present a fair cross-section of the community. Moreover, this un-
derrepresentation of death penalty objectors on capital juries in
Florida prevents such juries from serving as an accurate indicator
of community values regarding the limits of appropriate punish-
ment. This frustrates the ability of capital juries to play the essen-
tial role contemplated for them by Florida's death penalty statu-
tory scheme and is inconsistent with basic eighth amendment
values. Capital punishment is constitutional only if its continued
imposition does not violate the enlightened conscience of the com-
munity. For the jury to serve as the conscience of the community,
it must decide cases the way the community would, and to do this,
it must be fairly representative of the community.
"Automatic life imprisonment" jurors thus should not be sub-
ject to challenge for cause in Florida. Their inclusion on capital
juries would frustrate no legitimate state interest. By definition,
these jurors are able fairly and impartially to assess guilt, and their
inability to recommend a sentence of death does not prevent them
from playing their essential role in the sentencing portion of the
capital case. Therefore, including these jurors in capital juries will
not frustrate the state's interest in convicting the guilty or its in-
terest in imposing the death penalty in appropriate cases. Allowing
these jurors to serve would result in capital juries able to assess
guilt with increased impartiality, and with an increased ability to
reflect the conscience of the community on the critical question of
life or death.1
165. If the removal for cause of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors is held improper,
then these jurors either would serve on capital juries, or their removal would require the
expenditure of some of the prosecution's limited number of peremptory challenges. In Flor-
ida each party is given ten peremptory challenges in a capital case, FLA. STAT. §
913.08(1)(a)(2)(1983); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350(a), plus an additional peremptory challenge for
each alternate juror (usually two) selected, FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.350(f). Any systematic use of
these peremptory challenges to exclude "automatic life imprisonment" jurors, should they
be held not subject to removal for cause, would, as I have previously argued, be unconstitu-
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tional. See generally Winick, supra note 1. Moreover, if held improper, the removal of "au-
tomatic life imprisonment" jurors-under the Supreme Court's general practice in death
penalty cases involving the improper removal of scrupled jurors-would require that any
death sentence returned in a case in which this had occurred be vacated. Davis v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam) (improper removal of even one juror requires vacation of
death sentence); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 956 (11th Cir. 1983) (existence of available
peremptory challenge does not render error harmless); Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1300
(5th Cir. 1979) (existence of available peremptory challenge does not render error harmless),
afl'd en banc, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980); Chandler v. State, 8 FLA. L. WEEKLY 291, 291-92
(Fla. July 28, 1983) (rejecting harmless error approach). In addition, if held unconstitutional
under either the sixth amendment/due process right to an impartial jury or the sixth
amendment cross-section requirement, any resulting conviction must be set aside. Keeten v.
Garrison, No. C-C-77-193-M (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 1984); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. at
1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
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